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We present a violation of the CHSH inequality without the fair sampling assumption with a
continuously pumped photon pair source combined with two high efficiency superconducting detec-
tors. Due to the continuous nature of the source, the choice of the duration of each measurement
round effectively controls the average number of photon pairs participating in the Bell test. We
observe a maximum violation of S = 2.01602(32) with average number of pairs per round of ≈ 0.32,
compatible with our system overall detection efficiencies. Systems that violate a Bell inequality
are guaranteed to generate private randomness, with the randomness extraction rate depending on
the observed violation and on the repetition rate of the Bell test. For our realization, the optimal
rate of randomness generation is a compromise between the observed violation and the duration of
each measurement round, with the latter realistically limited by the detection time jitter. Using
an extractor composably secure against quantum adversary with quantum side information, we cal-
culate an asymptotic rate of ≈ 1300 random bits/s. With an experimental run of 43 minutes, we
generated 617 920 random bits, corresponding to ≈ 240 random bits/s.
Based on a violation of a Bell inequality, quantum
physics can provide randomness that can be certified to
be private, i.e., uncorrelated to any outside process [1–3].
Initial experimental realizations of such sources of certi-
fied randomness are based on atomic or atomic-like sys-
tems, but exhibit extremely low generation rates, making
them impractical for most applications [2, 4]. Advances
in high efficiency infrared photon detectors [5, 6], com-
bined with highly efficient photon pair sources, allowed
experimental demonstrations of loophole free violation of
the Bell inequality using photons [7, 8]. Due to the small
observed violation of the Bell inequality in these setups,
the random bit generation rate is on the order of tens per
second in [9], where they close all loopholes and are lim-
ited by the repetition rate of the polarization modulators,
and 114 bit/s [10], where they close only the detection
loophole and the main limitation is the fixed repetition
rate of the photon pair source.
In this work, we use a source of polarization entan-
gled photon pairs operating in a continuous wave (CW)
mode, and define measurement rounds by organizing the
detection events in uniform time bins. The binning is
set independently of the detection time, thus avoiding
the coincidence loophole [11, 12]. Superconducting de-
tectors with a high detection efficiency allow us to close
the detection loophole. We show how, for fixed overall
detection efficiency and pair generation rate, the time bin
duration determines the observed Bell violation. We then
estimate the rate of random bits that can be extracted
from the system and its dependence on time bin width.
Theory. – Bell tests are carried out in successions of
rounds. In each round, each party chooses a measure-
ment and records an outcome. The simplest meaningful
scenario involves two parties, each of which can choose
between two measurements with binary outcome. Alice
and Bob’s measurements are labelled by x, y ∈ {0, 1},
respectively; their outcomes are labelled a, b ∈ {+1,−1}.
As figure of merit we use the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH) expression
S = E00 + E01 + E10 − E11 , (1)
where the correlators are defined by
Exy := Pr(a = b|x, y)− Pr(a 6= b|x, y) . (2)
As well known, if S > 2, the correlations cannot be
due to pre-established agreement; and if they can’t be
attributed to signaling either, the underlying process is
necessarily random. This is not only a qualitative state-
ment: the amount of extractable private randomness can
be quantified. In the limit in which the statistics are col-
lected from an arbitrarily large number of rounds, the
number of random bits per round, according to [2], is at
least
r∞ ≥ 1− log2
(
1 +
√
2− S
2
4
)
. (3)
Tighter bounds on the extractable randomness as a func-
tion of S can be obtained by solving a sequence of
semidefinite programs [2].
Besides the no-signaling assumption, this certification
of randomness is device-independent: it relies on the
value of S extracted from the observed statistics, but
not on any characterisation of the degrees of freedom or
of the devices used in the experiment. All that matters
2is that in every round both parties produce an outcome.
In our case, we decide that, if a party’s detectors did not
fire in a given round, that party will output +1 for that
round. This convention allows us to use only one detec-
tor per party [13, 14]: in the rounds when the detector
fires, the outcome will be −1.
While the certification is device-independent, the de-
sign of the experiment requires detailed knowledge and
control of the physical degrees of freedom. Our exper-
iment uses photons entangled in polarisation, produced
by spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC).
Let us first consider a simplified model, in which a
pair of photons is created in each round. Eberhard [15]
famously proved that, when the collection efficiencies ηA
and ηB are not unity, higher values of S are obtained
using non-maximally entangled pure states. So we aim
at preparing
|ψ〉 = cos θ|HV 〉 − eiφ sin θ|V H〉 , (4)
where H and V represent the horizontal and vertical po-
larization modes, respectively. The state and measure-
ment that maximise S are a function of ηA and ηB . For
φ = 0, the optimal measurements correspond to linear
polarisation directions, denoted cosαxeˆH +sinαxeˆV and
cosβy eˆH + sinβy eˆV .
For a down-conversion source, the number of photons
produced per round is not fixed. If the duration τ of a
round is much longer than the single-photon coherence
time, and no multi-photon states are generated (a realis-
tic assumption in a CW pumped scenario), the output of
the source is accurately described by independent pho-
ton pairs, whose number v follows a Poissonian distri-
bution Pµ(v) of average pairs per round µ. The main
contribution to S > 2 will come from the single-pair
events; notice that Pµ(1) ≤ 1e ≈ 0.37 for a Poissonian
distribution. So there is always a large fraction of other
pair number events, and the observed value of S de-
pends significantly on it [16]. For µ → 0, almost all
rounds will give no detection, that is P (+1,+1|x, y) ≈ 1
which leads to S = 2. So, for µ ≪ 1 we expect a vio-
lation S ≈ Pµ(1)Squbits + (1 − Pµ(1))2, where Squbits is
the value achievable with state (4). In the other limit,
µ ≫ 1, almost all round will have a detection, that is
P (−1,−1|x, y) ≈ 1 and again S = 2. Before this be-
havior kicks in, when more than one pair is frequently
present we expect a drop in the value of S, since the
detections may be triggered by independent pairs. An
accurate modelling for any value of µ is conceptually
simple but notationally cumbersome; we leave it for Ap-
pendix A.
Photon pair sources based on pulsing quasi-CW sources
with a fixed repetition rate control the value of µ by
limiting the pump power. With true CW pumping the
average number of pairs per round is µ = (pair rate) · τ ,
where τ is the round duration. The resulting repetition
rate of the experiment is 1/τ . In this work, we fix the pair
rate, while τ is a free parameter that can be optimized
to extract the highest amount of randomness.
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FIG. 1: Schematic of the experimental setup, including the
source of the non-maximally entangled photon pairs. A PP-
KTP crystal, cut and poled for type II spontaneous para-
metric down conversion from 405 nm to 810 nm, is placed at
the waist of a Sagnac-style interferometer and pumped from
both sides. Light at 810 nm from the two SPDC process
is overlapped in a polarizing beam splitter (PBS), generating
the non-maximally entangled state described by Eq. (4) when
considering a single photon pair. A laser diode (LD) provides
the continuous wave UV pump light. The combination of a
half wave plate and polarization beam splitter (PBS) sets θ
by controlling the relative intensity of the two pump beams,
while a thin glass plate controls their relative phase φ. The
pump beams enter the interferometer through dichroic mir-
rors. At each output of the PBS, the combination of a HWP
and PBS projects the mode polarization before coupling into
a fiber single mode for light at 810 nm (SMF@810). A free
space link is used to transfer light from SMF@810 to single
mode fibers designed for 1550 nm (SMF-28e). Eventually the
light is detected with high efficiency superconducting Transi-
tion Edge Sensors (TES), and timestamped with a resolution
of 2 ns.
Experimental setup. – A sketch of the experimental
setup is shown in Fig. 1. The source for entangled pho-
ton pairs is based on the coherent combination of two
collinear type-II SPDC processes [17]. We pump a pe-
riodically poled potassium titanylphyspate crystal (PP-
KTP, 2× 1× 10mm3) from two opposite directions with
light from the same laser diode (405nm). Both pump
beams have the same Gaussian waists of ≈ 350µm lo-
cated within the crystal. Light at 810nm from the two
SPDC processes is overlapped in a polarizing beam split-
ter (PBS), entangling the polarization modes, and col-
lected into single mode fibers. When a single photon
pair is generated, the resulting polarization state is given
by Eq. (4), where θ and φ are determined by the relative
intensity and phase of the two pump beams set by rotat-
ing a half wave plate before the first PBS, and the tilt of
a glass plate in one of the pump arms.
The effective collection modes for the downconverted
light, determined by the single mode optical fibers and
incoupling optics was chosen to have a Gaussian beam
waist of ≈ 130 µm centered in the crystal in order to
maximize collection efficiency [18, 19]. The combination
of a zero-order half-wave plate and another PBS (extinc-
tion rate 1:1000 in transmission ) sets the measurement
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FIG. 2: Measured CHSH violation as function of bin width τ
(blue circles). A theoretical model (orange continuous line) is
sketched in the main text and described in detail in Appendix
A. Both the simulation and the experimental data show a
violation for short τ (zoom in inset). The uncertainty on the
measured value, calculated assuming i.i.d., corresponding to
one standard deviation due to a Poissonian distribution of
the events, is smaller than the symbols. For τ <
∼
1 µs the
detection jitter (≈ 170 ns) is comparable with the time bin,
resulting in a loss of observable correlation and a fast drop of
the value of S.
bases for light entering the single mode fibers. All opti-
cal elements are anti-reflection coated for 810nm. Light
from each collection fiber is sent to a superconducting
transition edge sensor (TES) optimized for detection at
810nm [5], which are kept at ≈ 80 mK within a cryo-
stat. As the detectors show the highest efficiency when
coupled to telecom fibers (SMF28+), the light collected
in to single mode fibers from the parametric conversion
source is transferred to these fibers via a free-space link.
The TES output signal is translated into photodetection
event arrival times using a constant fraction discrimina-
tor with an overall timing jitter ≈ 170ns, and recorded
with a resolution of 2 ns. Setting Alice’s and Bob’s an-
alyzing waveplates in the natural basis of the combin-
ing PBS, HV and V H , we estimate heralded efficien-
cies of 82.42 ± 0.31 % (HV ) and 82.24 ± 0.30 % (V H).
We identified two main sources of uncorrelated detection
events: intrinsic detector and background events at rates
of 6.7 ± 0.58 s−1 for Alice and 11.9 ± 0.77 s−1 for Bob,
respectively, and fluorescence caused by the UV pump
in the PPKTP crystal [20], contributing 0.135 ± 0.08%
of the signal. With a total pump power at the crystal of
5.8mW we estimate a pair generation rate ≈ 2.4×104 s−1
(detected ≈ 20× 103 s−1), and dark count / background
rates of 45.7 s−1 (Alice) and 41.5 s−1 (Bob).
Violation. – For the measured system efficiencies
(ηA ≈ 82.4%, ηB ≈ 82.2%) and rate of uncorrelated
counts at each detector (45.7 s−1 Alice, 41.5 s−1 Bob), a
numerical optimisation gives the following values of the
state and measurement parameters (see Appendix A for
details): θ = 25.9◦, α0 = −7.2◦, α1 = 28.7◦, β0 = 82.7◦,
and β1 = −61.5◦. These are close to optimal for all values
of µ, and the maximal violation is expected for µ = 0.322.
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FIG. 3: Randomness generation rate rn/τ as a function of τ
for different block sizes n. The points are calculated via
Eq. (5) for finite n (Eq. (6) for n→∞) and the violation mea-
sured in the experiment, assuming γ = 0 (no testing rounds)
and ǫc = ǫs = 10
−10. The continuous line is the asymptotic
rate Eq. (6) evaluated on the values of S of the simulation
shown in Fig. 2, for the same security assumptions.
We collected data for approximately 42.8 minutes,
changing the measurement basis every 2 minutes, cycling
through the four possible basis combinations. The se-
quence of the four settings is determined for every cycle
using a pseudo-random number generator. We periodi-
cally ensure that φ ≈ 0 by rotating the phase plate until
the visibility in the +45◦/−45◦ basis is larger than 0.985.
Excluding the phase lock, the effective data acquisition
time is ≈ 34 min.
In Fig. 2 we show the result of processing the times-
tamped events for different bin widths τ . The largest
violation S = 2.01602(32) is observed for τ = 13.150 µs,
which, with the cited pair generation rate of 24×103 s−1,
corresponds to µ ≈ 0.32. The uncertainty is calculated
assuming that measurement results are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.). Since the fluctuations of
S are identical in the i.i.d. and non-i.i.d. settings, this
uncertainty is also representative of the p-value associ-
ated with local models [21, 22]. The slight discrepancy
between the experimental violation and the simulation is
attributed to the non-ideal visibility of the state gener-
ated by the photon pair source. When τ is comparable
to the detection jitter, detection events due to a single
pair may be assigned to different rounds, decreasing the
correlations. This explains the drop of S below 2 (which
our simulation does not capture because we have not in-
cluded the jitter as a parameter).
Randomness extraction. – In order to turn the out-
put data generated from our experiment into uniformly
random bits, we need to employ a randomness expansion
protocol [23]. Such a protocol consists of a pre-defined
number of rounds n, forming a block. Each round is
randomly assigned (with probability γ and 1 − γ, re-
spectively) to one of two tasks: testing the device for
faults or eavesdropping attempts, or generating random
bits. When the test rounds show a sufficient violation,
4one applies a quantum-proof randomness extractor to the
block, obtaining m random bits. The performance of the
extraction protocol is determined by completeness and
soundness security parameters, ǫc and ǫs. To ensure the
resulting string is uniform to within ≈ 10−10, we choose
ǫc = ǫs = 10
−10. The extraction protocol is a one-shot
extraction protocol, i.e., the security analysis does not
assume i.i.d.. The output randomness is composable and
secure against a quantum adversary holding quantum
side information [23]. The details of the protocol exe-
cution and its security proof are given in Appendix B.
For a block consisting of n rounds, the number of ran-
dom bits per round is at least
rn = ηopt(ǫ
′, ǫEA)− 4 logn
n
+ 4
log ǫEX
n
− 10
n
, (5)
where the function ηopt depends on the block size n, de-
tected violation S, and auxiliary security parameters ǫ′,
ǫEA, ǫEX. The choice of these auxiliary security param-
eters is required to add up to the chosen level of com-
pleteness and soundness. In the limit n → ∞ we obtain
a lower bound on the number of random bits per round
r∞ = 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
S2
4
− 1
)
, (6)
where h(p) := −p log2 p− (1−p) log2(1−p) is the binary
entropy function.
The extractable randomness rate rn/τ based on the ob-
served S is presented in Fig. 3 for various block sizes n.
For comparison, we also plot the asymptotic value r∞/τ
with S given by the simulation. The most obvious fea-
ture is that the highest randomness rate is not obtained
at maximal violation of the inequality. There one gets
highest randomness per round, but it turns out to be
advantageous to sacrifice randomness per round in favor
of a larger number of rounds per unit time. This opti-
mization will be part of the calibration procedure for a
random number generator with an active switch of mea-
surement bases. As explained previously, the detection
jitter affects the observable violation for τ comparable
to it. This causes the sharp drop for short time bins
observed for the experimental data. For fixed detector
efficiencies, we expect the randomness rate to increase
with higher photon pair generation rate, that is by in-
creasing the pump power, and to be ultimately limited
by the detection time jitter. Here, the use of efficient
superconducting nanowire detectors will be a significant
advantage.
We generated a random string from the data used to
demonstrate the violation. We sacrificed ≈ 22% of the
data as calibration to determine the optimal bin width
(8.9 µs), and estimate the corresponding violation. We
applied the extractor to the remaining≈ 78% of the data,
corresponding to 175 288 156 bins, obtaining 617 920 ran-
dom bits. From the total measurement time of 42.8 min,
we calculate a rate of ≈ 240 random bit/s. For details of
the extraction process see Appendix D. Considering only
the net measurement time, that is without the acquisi-
tion of the calibration fraction of the data, the phase
lock of the source, and the rotation of waveplate mo-
tors, we obtain a randomness rate of ≈ 396 bit/s. These
numbers are not necessarily optimal; more sophisticated
analysis demonstrated randomness extraction for very
low detected violations [9, 24], and may yield a larger
extractable randomness also in our case. Details of the
extraction procedure are in Appendix D.
Conclusion. – We experimentally observed a violation
of CHSH inequality with a continuous wave photon en-
tangled pair source without the fair-sampling assumption
combining a high collection efficiency source and high
detection efficiency superconducting detectors, with the
largest detected violation of S = 2.01602(32).
The generation rate of all probabilistic sources of en-
tangled photon pairs is limited by the probability of gen-
eration of multiple pairs per experimental round, accord-
ing to Poissonian statistics. The flexible definition of
an experimental round permitted by the CW nature of
our setup allowed us to study the dependence of the ob-
servable violation as function of the average number of
photon pairs per experimental round. This same flexi-
bility can be exploited to reduce the time necessary to
acquire sufficient statistics for this kind of experiments:
an increase in the pair generation rate is accompanied
by a reduction of the round duration. This approach
shifts the experimental repetition rate limitation from
the photon statistics to the other elements of the setup,
e.g. detectors time response or active polarization basis
switching speed.
The observation of a Bell violation also certifies the
generation of randomness. We estimate the amount of
randomness generated per round both in an asymptotic
regime and for a finite number of experimental rounds,
assuming a required level of uniformity of 10−10. When
considering the largest attainable rate of random bit
generation, the optimal round duration is the result of
the trade-off between observed violation and number of
rounds per unit time. While for an ideal realization the
optimal round duration would be infinitesimally short, it
is limited in our system by the detection jitter time. Our
proof of principle demonstration can be extended into
a complete, loophole-free random number source. This
requires closing the locality and freedom-of-choice loop-
holes, with techniques not different from pulsed photonic-
sources, with the only addition of a periodic calibration
necessary for determining the optimal time-bin.
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Appendix A: Modelling the violation of CHSH by a
Poissonian source of qubit pairs
The output of a CW-pumped SPDC process can be ac-
curately described as the emission of independent pairs
distributed according to Poissonian statistics of average
µ, if the time under consideration (in our case, the length
of a round) is much longer than the single-photon coher-
ence time. The goal of this appendix is to provide an
estimate of the observed CHSH parameter S for such a
source.
The pairs being independent, it helps to think in two
steps. First, each pair is converted into classical infor-
mation (α, β) ∈ {+,−} with probability
PQ(α, β|x, y) = Tr(ρΠxα ⊗Πyβ) , (A1)
where the Π’s are measurement operators. If some of the
events have α = − (β = −), Alice’s (Bob’s) detector may
be triggered, leading to the observed outcome a = −1
(b = −1).
For the purpose of studying CHSH, it is sufficient to
consider P (−1,+1|x, y) and P (+1,−1|x, y), since
Exy = 1− P (−1,+1|x, y)− P (+1,−1|x, y) . (A2)
6With our convention of outcomes, P (−1,+1|x, y) is the
probability associated with the case when Alice’s detector
clicks and Bob’s does not. Thus, Bob’s detector should
not be triggered by any pair: each pair will contribute to
P (−1,+1|x, y) with
D(α) ≡ PQ(α,+|x, y) + (1− ηB)PQ(α,−|x, y) . (A3)
Now, let us look at the contribution by v pairs to
P (−1,+1|x, y). At least one of the α’s must be − for
the detector to be triggered; and multiple detections will
also be treated as a = −1. Thus, a configuration in which
exactly k α’s are − leads to a = −1 with probability
1− (1− ηA)k (i.e. at least one α = − must trigger a de-
tection). Obviously there can be
(
v
k
)
such configurations,
so the contribution of the v pair events to P (−1,+1|x, y)
is
Dv =
v∑
k=1
(
v
k
)
[1 − (1− ηA)k]D(−)kD(+)v−k . (A4)
Finally,
P (−1,+1|x, y) =
∞∑
v=0
Pµ(v)Dv . (A5)
The calculation of P (+1,−1|x, y) is identical, with
D(β) ≡ PQ(+, β|x, y) + (1 − ηA)PQ(−, β|x, y) and ηB
instead of ηA in (A4).
Because the quantum probabilities appear in such a
convoluted way, the optimal parameters for both the
state and the measurements are not the same as for the
single-pair case. Upon inspection, however, the values
are close, as expected from the fact that the violation is
mostly contributed by the single-pair events.
The curves presented in Fig. 2 have been obtained
with a slightly modified model that includes the effect
of the background events. The quantum probabilities
PQ(α, β|x, y) have been computed with ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| given
in (4) and with projective measurements, with the values
of the parameters given in the main text.
Appendix B: Protocol and security proof
For completeness, we will present the protocol stud-
ied in [23] and give explicit constants in its security
proof. We also refer to this paper for basic defini-
tions of (smooth) min-entropy and related quantities. It
will be more convenient for us to switch to to the no-
tation a, b ∈ {0, 1} for the outcome labels (instead of
a, b ∈ {+1,−1} of the main text) and use the language
of nonlocal games with winning condition
wCHSH(a, b, x, y) =
{
1 if a⊕ b = x · y ,
0 otherwise .
(B1)
The game winning probability is then w = 1/2 + S/8 in
terms of the CHSH value. The optimal classical winning
strategy achieve a winning probability of 0.75, while the
optimal quantum strategy achieves a winning probability
of (2 +
√
2)/4 ≈ 0.85.
A randomness expansion protocol is a procedure that
consumes r-bits of randomness and generates m-bits of
almost uniform randomness. Formally, a (ǫc, ǫs)-secure
r → m randomness expansion protocol if given r uni-
formly random bits,
• (Soundness) For any implementation of the de-
vice it either aborts or returns an m-bit string
Z ∈ {0, 1}m with
(1− Pr[abort]) ‖ρZRE − ρUm ⊗ ρUr ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫs ,
where R is the input randomness register, E is the
adversary system, and ρUm , ρUr are the completely
mixed states on appropriate registers.
• (Completeness) There exists an honest implemen-
tation with Pr[abort] ≤ ǫc.
We remark that this security definition is a composable
definition assuming quantum adversary, but not compos-
able assuming a no-signalling adversary [23]. Compos-
ability allows the randomness generated to be safely used
inside a larger protocol, such as quantum key distribu-
tion, without compromising the latter’s security.
For a concrete randomness expansion protocol, we
present the protocol studied in [23]. The protocol takes
parameters γ expected fraction (marginal probability) of
test rounds, ωexp expected winning probability for an
honest (perhaps noisy) implementation, and δest width
of the statistical confidence interval for the estimation
test. In an execution, for every round i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
• Bob chooses a random bit Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that
Pr(Ti = 1) = γ using the interval algorithm [25].
• If Ti = 0 (randomness generation), Alice and Bob
choose deterministically (Xi, Yi) = (0, 0), otherwise
Ti = 1 (test round) they choose uniformly random
inputs (Xi, Yi).
• Alice and Bob use the physical devices with the said
inputs (Xi, Yi) and record their outputs (Ai, Bi).
• If Ti = 1, they compute
Ci = wCHSH(Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi) . (B2)
They abort the protocol if
∑
j Cj < (ωexpγ − δest)n
where j is the index of test rounds, otherwise they re-
turn Ext(AB,Z) where Ext is a randomness extractor,
AB = A1B1...AnBn and Z is a uniformly random seed.
More precisely, we use a Trevisan extractor in [26]
based on polynomial hashing with block weak design, be-
cause of its efficiency in terms of seed length. This is a
function Ext : {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m such that if
Hmin(AB|E) ≥ 4 log 1ǫ1 + 6 +m then
1
2
∥∥ρExt(AB,Z)ZE − ρUm ⊗ ρUd ⊗ ρE∥∥1 ≤ mǫ1 (B3)
7The seed length of this extractor is d = a(2ℓ)2 where
a =
⌈
log(m− 2e)− log(2ℓ− 2e)
log(2e)− log(2e− 1)
⌉
(B4)
ℓ =
⌈
log 2n+ 2 log
2
ǫ1
⌉
(B5)
Now it can be shown that the entropy accumulation
protocol gives the completeness and soundness of our
randomness expansion protocol. However, let us men-
tion how the input randomness affects the soundness and
completeness of the final protocol.
In the protocol we assume access to a certain uniform
randomness source, from which the random bits required
in the protocol are generated: the Ti, Xi and Yi. In
certain rounds, Xi and Yi are either deterministic or
fully random bits and can be directly obtained from the
source. On the other hand, Ti must be simulated from
the uniform source (except when γ = 1/2 which is not
usually the case in practice). This can be done efficiently
by the interval algorithm [25]: the expected number of
random bits needed to generate one Bernoulli(γ) is at
most h(γ) + 2 and the maximum number of random bits
needed is at most Lmax := max{log γ−1, log(1 − γ)−1}.
Then Lemma 16 of [23] gives us: let γ > 0, for any
n there is an efficient procedure that given (at most)
6h(γ)n uniformly random bits either it aborts with prob-
ability at most ǫSA = exp(−18h(γ)3n/Lmax) or outputs
n bits T1, . . . , Tn whose distribution is within statistical
distance at most ǫSA of n i.i.d. Bernoulli(γ) random vari-
ables. This raises both the completeness and soundness
parameter of the final protocol by ǫSA.
In an honest implementation of the protocol, Alice and
Bob execute the protocol with a device that performs
i.i.d. measurements on a tensor product state resulting
in an expected winning probability ωexp. Here Lemma
8 of [23] bounds the probability of aborting using Ho-
effding’s inequality. That is, the probability that our
randomness expansion protocol aborts for an honest im-
plementation is
Pr[abort] ≤ exp(−2nδ2est) =: ǫest . (B6)
Therefore, the total completeness is bounded by ǫSA +
ǫest. (Note that ǫest is actually the completeness param-
eter of the entropy accumulation protocol in [23].)
For the soundness, Corollary 11 of [23] ensures that
for any ǫEA, ǫ
′ ∈ (0, 1) either the protocol aborts with
probability greater than 1− ǫEA or
Hǫ
′
min(AB|XYTE)ρ|pass > n · ηopt(ǫ′, ǫEA) . (B7)
Together with our extractor, for all ǫ1 ∈ (0, 1), if the
length m of the final string satisfies
n · ηopt(ǫ′, ǫEA) = 4 log 1
ǫ1
+ 6 +m (B8)
then we are guaranteed that
1
2
‖ρSRE − ρUm ⊗ ρUR ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫ′/2 +mǫ1 . (B9)
Here ηopt(ǫ
′, ǫEA) is given by the following equations: for
h the binary entropy and γ, p(1) ∈ (0, 1]
ηopt(ǫ
′, ǫEA) = max
3
4<
pt(1)
γ
<
2+
√
2
4
η(ωexpγ − δest, pt, ǫ′, ǫEA) , (B10)
η(p, pt, ǫ
′, ǫEA) = fmin(p, pt)− 1√
n
2
(
log 13 +
d
dp(1)
g(p)|pt
)√
1− 2 log(ǫ′ǫEA) , (B11)
fmin(p, pt) =
{
g(p) if p(1) ≤ pt(1) ,
d
dp(1)g(p)|pt · p(1) +
(
g(pt)− ddp(1)g(p)|pt · pt(1)
)
if p(1) > pt(1)
(B12)
g(p) =


1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
16 p(1)
γ
(
p(1)
γ
− 1
)
+ 3
)
if p(1)
γ
∈
[
0, 2+
√
2
4
]
1 if p(1)
γ
∈
[
2+
√
2
4 , 1
] (B13)
Combined with the input sampling soundness, the total
soundness is bounded by ǫSA + ǫEA + ǫ
′/2 +mǫ1.
Finally, let us count the number of random bits con-
sumed in the protocol. It consists of the randomness used
to decide if a round is a test or generation round, the ran-
domness used to pick the inputs in a test round, and the
randomness used for the Trevisan extractor. Taking into
account the finite statistical fluctuations, we need at most
6h(γ)n bits to choose between test and generation except
with probability ǫSA. This results in at most 2γn test-
ing rounds except with probability ǫSA, which equates
to 2 × 2γn random bits being consumed for generating
the inputs for test rounds. The randomness for Trevisan
extractor is d bits. (Practically, after the first run of the
8Parameter Definition
ǫc completeness, bounding honest abort probability
ǫs soundness, bounding randomness security
ǫSA input sampling error tolerance
ǫ′ smoothing parameter
ǫ1 1-bit extractor error tolerance
ǫEX randomness extractor error tolerance
ǫest Bell estimation error tolerance
ǫEA soundness of entropy accumulation protocol
TABLE I: Definition of security parameters.
protocol, we can omit this amount because the extractor
is a strong extractor: we can reuse the seed for next run
of the protocol). Summing these up, we have consumed
at most 6h(γ)n + 4γn + d uniformly random bits with
probability at least 1− 2ǫSA.
In summary, for a device with ωexp, any choice of
γ, ǫ1, ǫ
′, ǫEA ∈ (0, 1), and n large enough, our proto-
col is an (ǫSA + ǫest, ǫSA + ǫEA + ǫ
′/2 + mǫ1)-secure
[6h(γ)n+4γn+ d]→ m randomness expansion protocol.
That is either our protocol abort with probability greater
than 1 − ǫEA, or it produces a string of length m such
that 12 ‖ρSRE − ρUm ⊗ ρUR ⊗ ρE‖ ≤ ǫSA + ǫ′/2 + mǫ1 .
The protocol consume at most 6h(γ)n + 4γn + d uni-
formly random bits with probability at least 1− 2ǫSA.
Appendix C: Input/Output randomness analysis
The previous Appendix gives a complete picture of the
(one-shot) behavior of our randomness expansion proto-
col. For the purpose of this paper, it suffices to obtain
rough estimates on the randomness output, but further
optimization can be done.
For simplicity, we introduce some bounds on the re-
sources. Since m ≤ 2n we can let mǫ1 ≤ 2nǫ1 =: ǫEX
which gives ǫ1 = ǫEX/(2n). Plugging this back in (B8)
gives us the number of random bits one can extract,
m = n · ηopt(ǫ′, ǫEA)− 4 logn+ 4 log ǫEX − 10 , (C1)
for a given level of soundness ǫSA + ǫEA + ǫ
′/2 + ǫEX.
Moreover, the protocol consumes 6h(γ)n+ 4γn+ d bits
of randomness with probability at least 1− ǫSA, where
d = a(2ℓ)2 with a ≤ log(2n− 2e)− log(2ℓ− 2e)
log(2e)− log(2e− 1) + 1
and ℓ ≤ 3 logn+ 6− 2 log ǫEX . (C2)
This leads to an expansion of m − 6h(γ)n − 4γn − d.
Hence, the output randomness rate per unit time is
rn =
1
τ
(
ηopt(ǫ
′, ǫEA)− 4 logn
n
+ 4
log ǫEX
n
− 10
n
)
,
(C3)
and the net randomness rate per unit time is
rnetn =
1
τ
(
ηopt(ǫ
′, ǫEA)− 4 logn
n
+ 4
log ǫEX
n
− 10
n
− 6h(γ)− 4γ − d
n
)
. (C4)
These formulas are of course given for a protocol with
completeness ǫSA+ ǫest and soundness ǫSA+ ǫEA+ ǫ
′/2+
ǫEX, where
ǫSA = exp(−18h(γ)3n/Lmax) (C5)
Lmax = max{log γ−1, log(1− γ)−1} (C6)
ǫest = exp(−2nδ2est) . (C7)
The asymptotic rate for the block size n→∞ is given
by taking the limit of block size n
r∞ =
1
τ
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
S2
4
− 1
)]
. (C8)
For the net asymptotic rate we could also take the same
limit, however we could obtain a better bound by the
expected behavior of the interval algorithm. Since the
expected number of random bits needed to generate
T1, ..., Tn is nh(γ) + 2 by [25], and γn of which is ex-
pected to be test rounds each consuming 2 random bits,
we have the asymptotic net rate
rnet∞ =
1
τ
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
S2
4
− 1
)
− h(γ)− 2γ
]
.
(C9)
From an end-user perspective, one may argue that the
only parameters of interest are the completeness and
soundness security parameters which will constrain the
rest of protocol parameters—γ, δest, n, ǫ’s—for a given
9objective such as maximizing randomness rate or net ran-
domness rate. For the illustrative plots we set the con-
straints
ǫSA + ǫEA + ǫ
′/2 + ǫEX = ǫs , (C10)
ǫSA + ǫest = ǫc , (C11)
and fix ǫc = 10
−10, ǫs = 10−10. One then maximizes ran-
domness output or net randomness output given these
constraints. This gives us the best (as measured by our
objective function) protocol parameters within the relax-
ations made to obtain (C1) and (C2).
However, in the main text we take a simpler approach
without optimizing over the variables γ, δest, ǫ’s. For each
block size n, we compute ǫSA as given by (C5) which then
fixes δest via ǫest = 10
−10− ǫSA and (C7). The remaining
ǫ’s which have weight 10−10 − ǫSA are chosen in a 1 :
2 : 1 ratio of ǫEA : ǫ
′ : ǫEX, which is guaranteed to add
up to the specified level of completeness and soundness.
This approach is not far from optimal in the regime of
large block size n. This results in the experimental points
reported in Figure 3.
Appendix D: Random bits extraction procedure
As mentioned in the main text, the data observed dur-
ing the experiment contains certified randomness. Here
we describe the procedure we use to extract this random-
ness in a finite run of the experiment. We consider two
blocks of data, corresponding to an acquisition time of
≈ 42.8 min (dataset1) and ≈ 17.33 hours (dataset2).
The randomness protocol we use (described in Ap-
pendix B) relies on two elements:
• an honest implementation, and
• security parameters.
These elements must be chosen adequately before pro-
ceeding to the extraction. Indeed, if a too optimistic
honest implementation is chosen, for instance, the data
observed will fail to pass the test, and the whole protocol
will abort: no randomness can then be extracted.
Moreover, our setup allows us to choose freely the
• bin width
which can significantly affect the amount of certified ran-
domness.
We dedicate a fraction γcalib of our data to the estima-
tion of these parameters so as to maximize the amount
of randomness certified. The randomness protocol is
then run with these parameters on the remaining fraction
(1−γcalib) of the data only. We determine the fraction of
data γcalib to use for the calibration of the randomness ex-
traction procedure from a simulation of the experiment.
We estimate the number of random bits that can be cer-
tified from an experiment of the envisioned length if a
fraction γcalib of the data is dedicated to calibration pur-
pose (all other parameters being set as expected). We
choose the value of γcalib that maximizes this quantity.
We find that γcalib = 22% is adequate for dataset1, and
γcalib = 8% for dataset2.
We then proceed to define the parameters of the ran-
domness protocol. The security parameters ǫs, ǫc are set a
priori, with all the other parameters derived as described
in Appendices B and C, with γ = 1. We define hon-
est implementation an implementation which reproduces
the CHSH violation observed during the calibration stage
with probability
P (Sexp ≥ Scalib) ≥ ǫcalib . (D1)
For concreteness, we set ǫcalib = 10
−10. This step guar-
antees that we will not overestimate the amount of Bell
violation which we can expect from a honest experiment.
This is crucial for the whole certification procedure to
succeed with a large probability. We then have
wexp = wcalib − δcalib , (D2)
with δcalib = B(ωexp, (1− γcalib)n, ωcalib), where
B(p, n, q) =
nq∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i (D3)
is the cumulative distribution of n Bernoulli variable with
parameter p. For simplicity, we use the upper bound
δcalib ≤
√
log(1/ǫcalib)
2n
(D4)
valid for all winning probability ωcalib, which leads to a
conservative estimate of the honest implementation Bell
violation Sest.
Having fixed all security parameters and defined our
honest implementation, we are now left with the choice of
the bin width. For this, following the procedure discussed
in the main text, we compute the number of certified
random bits that we can hope to certify in the remaining
(1 − γcalib) fraction of the data as a function of the bin
width. We then choose the bin width which yields the
maximum rate of random bits. We find that optimal bin
widths 8.9 µs for dataset1 and 5.35 µs for dataset2.
This allows us to define how the remaining data is to be
treated: first, we extract the outcomes corresponding to
the chosen bin width, then we use the exact number of
bins so extracted to compute precisely the threshold Bell
violation wexp − δest and the number of certified bits m
corresponding to this dataset, finally we check whether
the data indeed yields a Bell violation larger than wexp−
δest. If this is not the case, we abort. Otherwise, we
apply a randomness extractor on the string of outcomes.
Both datasets pass this test.
Finally, we use the Trevisan extractor implemented by
Mauerer et al. [26], and further improved by Bierhorst
et al. [9] to extract the certified bits. The advantage
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of Trevisan extractors over other kinds of randomness
extractors is that they require little initial seeds, and
that they are composable, strong extractors, and secure
against quantum side information. Following the sugges-
tion of [26], we use the block weak design construction
with a RSH extractor to maximize the number of ex-
tracted bits. The extractor also require a supply of seed
randomness. For this, we use the bits generated with the
random number generator described in [27].
In the end, we extract 617 920 and 35 799 872 uni-
formly random bits from dataset1 and dataset2 respec-
tively, using seeds of length 1 808 802 and 2 923 224. The
corresponding rates, calculated including the acquisition
time of the calibration data, source phase lock and ba-
sis switching, are ≈ 240 bits/s and ≈ 573 bits/s. If
we consider only the time necessary for the data acqui-
sition, we obtain net randomness rates of ≈ 396 bit/s
and ≈ 943 bit/s.
These rates do not include the processing time of the
Trevisan extractor. This classical computation took 9
hours for dataset1 and 22 days for dataset2 on a ma-
chine processing 24 threads in parallel. This task could
be heavily parallelized. The bits extracted can be found
in the ancillary files [28].
We used the NIST Statistical Test Suite [29] to ensure
the quality of generated strings is at least on par with
acceptable pseudo-randomness. This suit of test can only
verify the uniformity of the generated random string, it
does not certify its privacy. The string generated from
dataset1 passed all the tests that are meaningful for
this relatively short data sample, assuming an acceptable
significance level α = 0.01. The result of the individual
tests are summarized in table II.
Test P–value Proportion
Frequency 0.590949 96/97
Block Frequency 0.275709 95/97
Cumulative Sums Forward 0.964295 96/97
Cumulative Sums Backward 0.637119 96/97
Runs 0.162606 97/97
Longest Run of Ones 0.590949 96/97
Discrete Fourier Transform 0.183769 96/97
TABLE II: Result of the NIST Statistical Test Suite for the
bits extracted from dataset1. We split the random bits into
97 sequences of 6300 bits each.
